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Infrastructural Relations: water, political power 
and the rise of new “despotic regimes” 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is 60 years since Karl Wittfogel pointed to a key relationship between political power 
and the ownership and control of water. Subsequent studies have suggested, 
commensurately, that exclusion from the ownership of essential resources represents a 
fundamental form of disenfranchisement – a loss of democratic involvement in societal 
direction. Several areas of theoretical development have illuminated these issues. 
Anthropologists have further elaborated theories suggesting a recursive relationship 
between political arrangements and cosmological belief systems. Narrow legal definitions 
of property have been challenged through the consideration of more diverse ways of 
owning and controlling resources. Analyses of material culture have shown how it 
extends human agency, as well as having agentive capacities itself, and explorations of 
infrastructures have highlighted their role in composing socio-technical and political 
relations. Such approaches are readily applied to water and the material culture through 
which it is controlled and used. Drawing on historical and ethnographic case studies, this 
paper therefore considers the anthropology of water infrastructure. Tracing changing 
relationships between water, cosmological beliefs, infrastructure and political 
arrangements over time, it suggests that we are witnessing the emergence of new 
“despotic regimes”.  
 
KEYWORDS: water privatisation, water governance, transnational water ownership, 
human-non-human relations; UK, Australia 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1957, when Karl Wittfogel proposed, via a study of water and governance in Asia, that 
there was an intrinsic relationship between the control of water and political power, and 
that such a relationship underpinned “despotic regimes”, he had little difficulty in 
persuading the academy that this was a reasonable supposition. Every human society, 
throughout history and across diverse cultures, has valorised and often worshipped water 
as the most essential element and as the generative source of health and wealth. Against 
a historical backdrop in which cultural groups, religions, larger societies and states, have 
vied – often with extreme measures – for the control of water, and major irrigation 
schemes and centralised forms of governance seem to have emerged simultaneously, 
Wittfogel”s proposition rang true. How could it not be empowering to control the stuff of 
life itself? How could major infrastructural developments be managed without some form 
of centralisation? 
 
In the decades since, many scholars have built on his analysis, usefully articulating the 
ways in which water intersects with social and political relations. However, while there 
remains general agreement with his fundamental proposition, what has emerged is a 
more complex picture in which it can be seen that many kinds of power – not just 
despotic regimes – are enabled through the control and management of water. And, 
other studies have shown centralised governance is by no means the only way of 
managing substantial water infrastructures (Lansing 1991, Glick 1996).  
 
This paper examines the relationship between water and power through an 
anthropological lens, addressing in particular the role of infrastructure. It draws on 
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several areas of anthropological theory, most specifically work on the relationships 
between political structures and cosmological beliefs; emergent concepts of human-
environmental relations, and theories concerned with agency and materiality. It makes 
use of recent work on property, which has drawn attention to the many different ways in 
which water can be owned. And, stepping beyond anthropology, it considers some of the 
long-term historical dimensions of water control; interdisciplinary theories about socio-
technological systems and assemblages, and recent philosophical debates about bioethics 
and non-human rights.  
 
The paper offers several propositions. It observes that there is wide historical and 
cultural diversity in the ways that water control and management have been socially and 
politically negotiated, with and without sophisticated infrastructural schemes. These 
range from democratic, collective systems, to those characterised by extreme hierarchy 
and exclusivity. It argues that much depends on the ways in which ownership and rights 
are distributed, and suggests that a crucial element – often neglected in analyses of 
water and power – are the underlying cosmological beliefs and values (religious or 
secular) which both define and affirm societal arrangements. With regard to this latter 
issue, it suggests that there may be a direct relationship between the development of 
large-scale water infrastructures and the euhemerisation of religious deities (Strang 
2014??). 
 
Distributions of property and rights are the clearest measure of social and political 
equality (Widlok and Tadesse 2005). While the ownership of essential resources and 
related material systems is plainly part of what constitutes political power, there are 
multiple ways in which both ownership and power can be distributed. Even when the 
latter does take the form of centralised government, as Alexander points out, the State 
may adopt quite different roles. It may (as Wittfogel argued) act as “other” to the people 
and enforce a despotic regime; it may take on a paternal role as a representative “of” the 
people; or – underpinned by collective ownership arrangements – it may act more 
directly “as” the people (Alexander 2004). There is also a question about whether 
centralised managerial control and responsibility leads, inevitably, to forms of 
empowerment that alienate those “in charge” from the rest, and this potential is nicely 
illustrated by Herzfeld”s work on how bureacracies become “indifferent” to the 
populations they are putatively intended to serve (1991).   
 
A process of hierarchy creation and the emergence of governing elites is certainly evident 
in a long-term global trend towards the enclosure and privatisation of water and indeed 
other resources which, as Hann observed, has brought about a critical shift in property 
and social relations (1998). This trend has often subsumed more egalitarian and 
collective arrangements, and I would argue that in so doing it has systematically 
disenfranchised the majority of human, as well as non-human, beings, effectively placing 
the control of water and power in fewer and fewer hands. There are some notable gender 
issues too: dispossession has tended not only to replace common water ownership with 
that of elites, but has also favoured male control of water and power. In recent decades, 
the ownership and control of much of the world”s freshwater water has passed into the 
hands of unregulated and largely unaccountable transnational corporations. On this 
basis, I suggest that we are witnessing, at a global level, the emergence of an entirely 
new form of “despotic regime”. 
 
Material Properties 
 
The link between water and power is, most fundamentally, an expression of material 
relations. No exercise of power is possibly unless it can be expressed in material form, in 
this instance through the physical control of water bodies; or through the capacity to 
determine (from whatever distance) whose interests will benefit from the flow of water. 
However, material relations are not just between persons, and water is a far from 
passive participant in this relationship. All regimes of water control are influenced by the 
material properties of water and its specific physical behaviours. The fluidity of water, the 
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difficulty of capturing and containing it, and variability in hydrological flows inevitably 
challenge certainties of ownership and control (Strang and Busse 2011). Every water 
regime, however technically proficient, has to balance assumptions about control with the 
reality that water exerts forms of material agency that cannot always be directed, and 
which may at times override human efforts (Edgeworth 2011. Each managerial regime is 
therefore a negotiation between political arrangements; the material forms of 
infrastructure that contain and direct water; and the vagaries of wider hydrological 
processes.  
 
This usefully highlights a theoretical perspective, encapsulated by Actor Network Theory 
(Latour 2005), that material relations, and human-environmental relations more 
generally, involve multiple human and non-human actors, including water. As these 
theories and related work on social and technical systems (STS) have made clear, all of 
these actors are engaged in fluid processes in which they, and their relations, interact 
dynamically (Harvey 2012). Just as water flows demonstrate major fluctuations and 
changes over time, water infrastructures undergo constant change and development, as 
do the various social groups engaging with these at local, regional, national and now 
international levels. So, in considering any regime of water governance and control, and 
its infrastructural expressions, there is a need to recognise that all parties – the people, 
the material culture, the water and the wider environment and its other inhabitants and 
materials – are involved in volatile and transformational processes.  
 
However, as I have argued elsewhere (Strang 2014), neither social nor material relations 
are absolutely fluid. The flow of water itself is subject to physical laws and seasonal 
cycles which, though they may be difficult to predict precisely, demonstrate consistent 
patterns. Although anthropology has moved away from rigidly structural approaches, 
there remains an appreciation that social, spatial and political arrangements often have 
strong momentum and continuity over time. These continuities are of course supported 
by their expression in material form: all such arrangements are upheld through the 
composition of a material environment which serves as a recursive source of affirmation 
of specific beliefs, values and practices.  
 
Here the work of material culture specialists is useful in underlining how artefacts 
concretise ideas and agency. Gell”s depiction of material culture as a “prosthetic” 
extension of human agency (1998) is readily applied to water infrastructure to illuminate 
the relationship between how it forms and is formed by prevailing ideas about social, 
political and environmental relations (as well as by the properties of water itself). As I 
have noted elsewhere, the control of water is integral to people”s capacities to exert 
agency in the world, and to compose particular identities. The conflicts between, for 
example, farmers, conservation groups, recreational water users and indigenous 
communities, are in essence a product of different ways of striving to enact specific 
group (or individual) identities and values (Strang 2009).  
 
More broadly, at a societal level, there is a continuum of possibilities in the exertion of 
human agency, ranging from the low-key managerial methods of hunter-gatherer 
societies, which leave a considerable directive role with non-human species and things; 
through subtle but more distinctive forms of environmental control; to more extreme 
impositions of technologies with major capacities to override non-human ecosystem 
processes (Strang 2005). As this implies, increasingly sophisticated developments in 
water infrastructure have “prosthetically” enabled new distributions of power and agency, 
new human-environmental relations, and new kinds of propertisation. A series of 
(necessarily) very brief vignettes suggests a discernible pattern of development.  
 
Historical and Cultural Diversities 
 
a) Common Properties 
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In considering the political effects of water infrastructure, it may be useful to ask how 
water and power were distributed before such large-scale material culture was 
developed. For most of human history, societies” engagements with water involved only 
subtle, low-key methods of manipulating water flows, and the control of water has been 
acquired more straightforwardly through territorial ownership of water sources. However, 
archaeological and ethnographic evidence relating to hunter-gather societies shows that, 
even without material infrastructures, the ownership of key water sites was (and often 
continues to be) a vital underpinning to social, spatial, economic, religious and political 
organisation. In Australian Aboriginal societies, for example, such research shows a 
strong coincidence between water sources and sacred sites. According to Ancestral Law, 
inalienable land and water ownership, and thus social and economic power, are conferred 
by membership of the clans in whose estates such sites are located. As well as emplacing 
people spatially and socially, such membership also assures access to and the use of 
water and other resources.  
 
This demonstrates that relationships between the control of water and political power 
considerably precede infrastructural developments. It also draws useful attention to the 
way that rights to water and power were distributed in such contexts. As is typical with 
hunter-gatherer societies, indigenous Australians maintained highly egalitarian 
communities: land and water were held collectively by clans – and by women and men 
alike – in classic common property regimes (Ostrom 1990, Goddens and Tehan 2010). 
Governance was gerontocratic in form, and communities were led by both female and 
male elders (albeit with distinct areas of religious and ritual responsibility). Water 
management was materially minimal but – based on intensive levels of local ecological 
knowledge – it was also highly precise. People built temporary fish traps and weirs to 
maximise the benefit of water flows; they made use of a wide range of aquatic 
resources; and in some parts of the country they built small channels to provide 
supplementary irrigation to particularly useful species of aquatic flora and fauna. 
 
Considerable attention was given to ritual management, which involved regular 
engagement with sacred water places and the powerful ancestral beings believed to 
inhabit these. Human groups had a reciprocal responsibility to “care for country”, as 
Aboriginal elders put it, ensuring that it was kept “clean” and that all resources were 
protected and used sustainably (Strang 1997). In a Durkheimian sense,1 the flat 
oganisational structure that pertained politically was reflected in a classic “nature religon” 
which envisioned multiple ancestral deities inhabiting a sentient landscape and most 
particularly its water places. These highly localised totemic beings represented non-
human kinds  and (in the form of rainbow serpents and suchlike) water and all of its 
potentialities (Merlan 1998, Strang 2002). Their agentive powers were seen to produce 
seasonal and cyclical movements of water; plant and animal resources; and human spirit 
beings – in other words to generate life itself. Thus the control of water was not seen as 
being confined to humankind: in effect, this system extended both control and rights 
over water beyond humankind, creating a quintessentially egalitarian distribution of 
rights and interests. This was reflected in the subtle forms of material culture which, 
rather than overriding ecosystem processes or the activities of non-human species, 
simply aimed to enhance these. 
 
Such lifeways continue to provide a useful contrast to the changes that have occured in 
water and power regimes elsewhere, which – as the following historical overview 
elucidates  – involved a discernible pattern of articulation between infrastructural 
developments, intensification of water use, and related changes in cosmological and 
socio-political arrangements.  
 
b) Early impoundments  
 
                                                          
1
 Durkheim classically theorised that societies made their religions in their own image (1961). 
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With the advent of agriculture in the Neolithic period, new forms of water control began 
to appear which led many societies, step by step (though by no means in a unlinear 
form), towards greater impositions of human agency in relation to the material 
environment. Archaeological records suggest that in about 8000 BCE, there was low-key 
irrigation of taro and rice in SE Asia, based simply on the building of low bunds to retain 
floodwaters (Boomgaard 2007). Similar methods characterized flood irrigation in 
Mesopotamia (Biswas 1970). Populations, now settled in small agricultural communities, 
coordinated their economic activities with seasonal hydrological cycles. Fairly flat political 
structures pertained, as did the worship of powerful nature beings, but the emphasis 
shifted away from highly localized deities towards larger-scale rain-making gods (such as 
Osiris), whose role was to deliver the crucial annual floodwaters; and towards sun deities 
and the other celestial beings presiding over a calendar of seasonal agricultural activities.  
 
c) Gaining power 
 
Agricultural development tended to weaken previously strict limitations on growth in 
population and resource use. And the technical power to control water – as a form of 
control over life itself – has undeniable allure (Krause and Strang 2013, Strang 2013). 
Early success in retaining floodwaters encouraged more sophisticated infrastructural 
developments: intricate systems of wells (such as qanats and their intricate irrigation 
tunnels); tanks (for example, the major tanks storages that enabled irrigation in India); 
water-lifting technologies, and – perhaps more critically – major irrigation canals. The 
form of this material culture was therefore more directive, imposing greater degrees of 
human agency and subsuming that of the non-human.  
 
Although these technological developments supported more intensive food production 
and population growth, they also demanded regular and considerable investments of 
labour. As Wittfogel suggested, this required coordination and the centralised forms of 
management that are often cited as a key component in the emergence of more 
centralised and hierarchical forms of governance (Hocart 1970). For instance, although 
Wittfogel focused on Asia, the rich archaeological and historical records of early irrigation 
societies in areas such as Mesopotamia also suggest a key relationship between the rise 
of Pharoah-led political hierarchies and the development of new irrigation technologies 
(Butzer 1976). 
 
[Fig?? The Scorpion King illustration] 
 
Moves away from flat political structures and partnership with non-human agencies were 
reflected in religious shifts away from classic “nature religions” towards gods that, while 
retaining some animal and multiple gendered (including androgynous) forms, did not 
reflect such egalitarian human-non-human relations. The elevation of Pharoahs to the 
status of gods, responsible both for the coming of the rain and for the management of 
irrigation, is clearly indicative of new expectations about human agency in relation to 
water and the non-human world (Biswas 1970). A similar coincidence of religious 
development is evident in the Americas, where, in Aztec, Toltec, Inca and Mayan 
societies, God-Kings responsible for rainfall emerged alongside the development of 
irrigation technologies and agricultural intensification (Ferguson 2000).   
 
d) The Euhemerisation of Power 
 
From about 600 BCE, the building of Greek and Roman aquaducts in the Mediterranean 
region provided water supplies to new urban areas, supplying water as well as political 
power and status to emergent upper classes. This shift in lifeways coincided with the 
establishment of imperial rule. Providing for the enclosure of land and the introduction of 
more individuated forms of property rights, Roman Law brought with it rights to abstract 
water based on riparian land ownership although, spurred by respect for deities seen as 
responsible for parts of nature, it retained clear views that the flows of water should not 
be compromised in the process (aqua profluens) (Bruun 2010).  
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I would suggest it it not coincidental that, at the same time, the non-human beings 
inhabiting Greco-Roman religious pantheons euhemerised and took up residence in more 
distant Olympian heights. Greek forays into science, which drew on ideas already 
burgeoning in the Levant, hinted at an increasingly “disenchanted” and in consequence 
disempowered non-human world (Tuan 1998, Linton 2010). A similar point can be made 
about subsequent  shifts towards monotheistic religions, in which male and now 
thoroughly humanized Gods inhabited far away Heavens. According to Durkheimian logic, 
this reflected the creation of intensely centralised, hierarchical and patriarchal political 
structures and, both separating and demoting non-human beings into a subservient 
position, provided God-given “dominion” over Nature (Plumwood 1993, 2002).  
 
Such dominion went hand in hand with the development of more directive forms of 
environmental management. The Christianization of Europe was accompanied by a rapid 
takeover of previously “pagan” holy wells and their generative powers, and the spiritual 
authority of their resident (usually female) deities was appropriated by primarily male 
Christian saints (Strang 2004). While the wells were at first regarded as still having some 
miraculous powers (though with the Saints now receiving the credit), such beliefs, and 
their intimations of a sentient and agentive land and waterscape were rapidly repressed, 
becoming at first outright heresy and then – as such ideas faded to the point where they 
ceased to challenge religious authority – being described as mere “superstition”. Beliefs 
about water”s healing and generative powers were, over time, translated into more 
“rational” ideas about its mineral content and potential medical qualities (Anderson and 
Tabb 2002).  
 
The exercise of political and social power through the control of water was further 
illustrated by medieval Abbeys, the building of which led to much canalization to enable 
major movements of stone and timber. The Abbeys” political authority and their resident 
monks” expertise in impounding and managing water allowed them to take up a position 
of disbursing vital water supplies to local communities. Such a beneficent provision of the 
stuff of life (neatly echoing Biblical themes about God”s provision of water for productive 
purposes), helped to uphold the authority of the Church, at that stage still closely 
entwined with the power of the emerging State. The scientific thinking that began to gain 
ground during the late medieval period further disenchanted water, reframing it (and 
other materials) as passive “matter” subject to human action, thus affirming the 
conceptual bifurcation between Nature and Culture that monotheism had established 
(Plumwood 1993, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, moral views about the shared human ownership of water and access to its 
flows persisted. The Domesday Book, describing socio-spatial and economic 
arrangements in 11th century Britain, includes myriad details about the water mills 
dotted with great frequency along English rivers. As well as impounding water at regular 
stages, these required considerable social cooperation up and downstream to manage the 
river”s flows so that all millers, villages and parishes could benefit. Systems of water 
meadows, reliant upon channels, sluice gates and weirs to flood waterside meadows (in 
order to achieve a longer grass-growing season), similarly required major coordination. 
These arrangements relied primarily on negotation between water users, and on the 
expertise of local “watermen”.2 Water management was overseen, ultimately, by local 
authorities, whose major role was to resolve any disputes. Similar systems flourished in 
Europe, some of which have survived until today – for example, the well-known 
traditional irrigation schemes of Valencia, in which locally elected community judges 
continue to disburse water allocations and resolve disputes over water flows (Glick 
                                                          
2
 A nice comparative example is provided by Lansing”s classic work on Balinese water temples (1991), in which priests, 
imbued with the authority of local water goddesses and well versed in hydrological and technical knowledge, have for 
centuries mediated the flow of water through villages and rice terraces. In so doing, they have maintained both political and 
religious authority, even as, in more recent decades, water and environmental management has increasingly been seen as 
the purview of the state government.  
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1996). It is reasonable to infer from these and the earlier examples, then, that major 
infrastructures are not intrinsically reliant upon centralised forms of governance.  
 
However, while these changes were unfolding in Medieval Europe, the major canal 
building programme in Imperial China achieved its apogee, with the completion of an 
1800 km Great Canal built from south of China (Hangzhou) to Beijing in the north. This 
programme had begun much earlier, between 2207-1766 BCE, with channels in the Huai, 
Yellow and Yangtze rivers and the related establishment of the Han Dynasty (Pietz 2006). 
Such ambitious infrastructural development also brought forward a new cosmological 
figure, Yü the Great, descriptions of whom suggest a process of euhemerisation. In a 
cosmos (still) dominated by water serpent beings responsible for rain and springs, and 
for the movements of water between earth and sky, visual and textual representations of 
this legendary canal-maker and water controller segued over time from describing a 
somewhat vague mythological figure into accounts in which he appears more as a human 
ancestor or historical being (Pietz 2006). Each phase of canal and dam building in China 
enabled powerfully hierarchical dynastic governance, including the first Ministry of Water 
Conservancy, established by the Qin dynasty between 300 and 200 BCE, at which time 
the term shuili (“taking advantage of water”) began to appear in texts (Padovani 2006). 
 
e) Early Modern Infrastructures  
 
Chinese canal programmes continued to form a central part of this region”s social, 
economic and religious activities until about 1850, when the siltation and decay of the 
canal systems reached a point where the Qing government could no longer address the 
country”s irrigation problems (Halsema and Vincent 2006). The dynasty collapsed in 
1911, providing a stark illustration of how the loss of control over water can reverse 
political fortunes – even, as Wittfogel described them, “despotic regimes” (1957).  
 
The collapse of Chinese water infrastructure and its co-dependent system of governance 
echoed earlier societal implosions. Siltation, decay and the disruption of maintenance in 
politically unstable periods had led to the demise of the Mesopotamian irrigation 
societies, major dynasties in the Indus region, and other such schemes across Asia. 
Nevertheless, in each case there was a clear demonstration of the capacity of major 
water infrastructure to uphold political power and large-scale forms of governance, and 
to encourage related euhemerisation in religious belief systems.  
 
In the early modern period, industrialisation placed other societies, such as those in 
Europe, on a developmental track. With new scientific and engineering capacities, water 
infrastructure burgeoned rapidly. The building of canals, intense reliance on water power, 
and the development of major water storage and supply systems enabled rapid urban 
expansion and industrial growth. There followed, first in European countries and their 
colonies and then in other parts of the world, a massive programme of dam building for 
the purposes of irrigation and the generation of physical power. This served to affirm and 
expand Statehood. It brought into being more diverse forms of water ownership and 
management: by nations, states, municipalities and landowners, and it was accompanied 
by societal fragmentation and multiple levels and forms of inequality. 
 
In cosmological terms, while patriarchal monotheism continued to provide a backdrop to 
matching socio-political structures, intellectual authority shifted away from the Church 
and into Science, providing a new and quite different basis for all kinds of governance, 
including that of water. A view of the material world as both object and subject of human 
pre-eminence was reflected in infrastructural systems  – canals and diversions, pumps 
and reservoirs – that, by this time, were able to impose human agency to the extent that 
normal ecological processes could be almost completely overridden.  
 
This series of historical vignettes suggests a persistent recursive relationship between 
water infrastructure and political power, and a distinct pattern of social and religious 
change, in which rights and interests previously shared fairly equally between humans, 
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and between human and non-human beings, were considerably rearranged and 
redistributed. This redistribution of power and agency introduced critical inequalities 
within human societies, and between humans and non-human species. With human 
agency and interests firmly established as superior, it was perhaps an inevitable step 
towards the logic of current neo-liberal ideas, in which water and other “resources”, as 
well as non-human species, are seen to exist primarily to provide “ecosystem services” to 
humankind, or more specifically, to some human groups. These ideas have been further 
entrenched by a combination of ever more directive forms of water infrastructure and 
new forms of water ownership and governance. 
 
Fluid Forms of Governance 
 
a) Public and Private Water in the UK 
 
An account of 19th-20th century conflicts over water in the UK highlights the perennial 
tensions that many nation states have experienced in trying to reconcile different views 
of who should own and control water, while also trying to manage major differences in 
social, political and material scales. How should water infrastructure be funded and 
owned? 
Should infrastructure and supply management be the responsibility of local landowners, 
parishes, municipalities, counties, regions or the State itself? How should conflicting 
demands for water be prioritized and according to what criteria?  
 
Until the early 19th century in the UK, agricultural landowners maintained their riparian 
rights over water, though by this stage most of the land was held by a very small 
segment of society. Industries had gained access to water by clustering along rivers and 
abstracting water from them directly. But the mechanisation of agriculture and 
burgeoning new forms of production brought most of the population and increasing 
industrial activities into the cities. Pressing needs for piped water supplies to urban 
domestic households and to new industrial activities led to literal ownership rivalry.3  
 
On one side of the river were the Victorian industrialists who invested in private water 
supply companies and sometimes reservoirs, partly to support their productive activities 
and partly to fulfil a role (like the earlier Christian Abbeys) as beneficent philanthropists, 
taking paternal responsibility for (and of) a vital common good. In a staunchly Christian 
country, water was still seen not only as an economic good, but also as the substance of 
the spirit and the essence of life. On the other side of the river were the municipalities: 
local government bodies (to some extent also populated by land-owning elites and 
wealthy industrialists) who – with the same vision of water – saw its supply as a public 
political and social responsibility. In both cases, although the water itself was still 
formally regarded as a commons, the financial and managerial control of water sources 
and the infrastructure of water supply conferred de facto ownership, and the question as 
to whether this should be public or private therefore carried considerable political weight. 
In the first decades of the 20th century there was considerable argumentation over this 
question, with ownership of water supply infrastructure passing back and forth between 
private companies and municipalities.  
 
Debates over the “common good” provided by water were inevitably entangled with 
those concerned with democratic rights. The first World War had created major pressures 
for broader democratic enfranchisement. Prior to the conflict only 58% of the male 
population was eligible to vote (based on property and residence restrictions). The 
Representation of the People Act in 1918, while still excluding women under the age of 
30, provided suffrage for about 40% of women and for all British men over 21 (British 
Government 1918). Following continued activism demanding equal suffrage, all women 
over 21 gained the right to vote with the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) 
Act 1928 (British Government 1928).  
                                                          
3
 The etymological root of “rival” is of course “river”.  
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The Second World War further strengthened notions of nationhood, supporting both a 
common national identity and State levels of governance. It increased the pressure for 
democratic inclusion and, with a post-war Labor Government, provided sufficient impetus 
for the nationalisation of water supply companies as well as other essential utilities. This 
was further encouraged by a desire to see the State drive economic growth by supporting 
infrastructural developments. During the post-war period, therefore, water supply 
became (primarily) the responsibility of regional water authorities supported by the State 
government. Those responsible for water infrastructure were public servants, and 
enjoyed a largely positive relationship with the populace to whom they provided water 
supplies.  
 
This democratisation also meant, however, that the centralised government became 
responsible for charges for water supplies. Unsurprisingly, there was reluctance to attract 
political recrimination by raising the costs of an essential “common good”. Although the 
water flows and quality were now seen as being within the purview of science and 
engineering, a new biophysical idiom merely affirmed rather than undermined water”s 
status as the basis of economic, spiritual and physical health and well-being. Proposals to 
raise water charges were therefore met with deep resistance, as were any limitations on 
levels of use. Perhaps echoing some of the problems of previous governments assuming 
responsibility for major water infrastructures, it proved difficult for the State to gain 
support for investing in the necessary infrastructural maintenance and development.  
This difficulty enabled the Thatcher Government, in 1989, to argue that only privatising 
the water industry would permit the raising of capital for sufficient investment in new 
infrastructure and provide a more “efficient” system of water delivery (Bakker 2003, 
2005).  
 
Despite furious public protests, water privatisation was pushed through, and other key 
utilities were similarly sold off, with shares in theory democratically available to all, but in 
practice captured largely by corporate interests. In the quarter century since, water 
charges have risen dramatically, though largely without the promised investment in 
infrastructure. The installation of household meters measuring supply and usage has 
reframed water in more commoditising terms (Kopytoff 1986). Water users are now 
called “consumers” or more recently “customers”, suggesting that water is now wholly 
the cultural product of the water companies. And, until the practice was outlawed by a 
Labour Government elected in 1997, water companies were permitted to cut off supplies 
if households or businesses failed to pay their bills.  
 
Since Thatcher”s privatisation, most of the former regional water companies have been 
bought out by transnational corporations.  While water governance is now enmeshed in a 
complex network of public and private players, the ownership and control of key 
resources and infrastructure is once again the privilege of a small elite. This differs in a 
crucial respect from that composed of industrialists and landed gentry in the pre-War 
period: for the first time, the most power and agency lie not with people occupying the 
top layer of a specific society within a shared material environment, but with a 
transnational network composed of international corporations whose shares are often 
held by non-resident companies and individuals. National governments and the other 
parties involved in water governance have limited capacities to regulate the behaviour of 
these corporations with regard to the management of the most essential of resources, 
and even less to require their acceptance of broader social or environmental 
responsibilities.   
 
In consequence, although new technologies have made some real improvements to 
drinking water quality and urban water delivery, there has been little investment in major 
infrastructural improvements such as limiting leaks, or moving away from fiscally cheap 
but ecologically expensive upriver abstraction. River water quality has improved 
considerably, largely because of the demise of many polluting industries, but maintaining 
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ecologically healthy flows remains problematic. Water companies have proved reluctant 
to make investments in major water storages now that these are seen as risky and – if 
only maintaining reliable supplies to human communities – only rarely needed. Though 
they have necessarily responded to EU environmental directives with new treatment 
plants4 and pipe renovations to reduce leaks, they have focused heavily on “end of pipe” 
solutions rather than major changes in abstraction and supply practices. In the early 
2000s, some efforts were made to address environmental issues with the 2003 Water 
Act, which returned some responsibility to the Government to ensure sustainable water 
use (HM Government, 2003).5 Independent bodies were established: Waterwise to 
encourage more ecologically responsible industry practices in the water industry, and a 
Water Saving Group to persuade water users to reduce household consumption (DEFRA, 
2005). The Environment Agency was given greater powers to demand more sustainable 
industry practices. However, with a view to driving market reform (see Castree 2010) 
many of these mechanisms were dismantled or sidelined by the coalition Government, 
and will surely not be re-introduced following the recent election.  
 
While some gains have been made through the development of water efficient 
appliances, domestic patterns of water use have remained relatively inelastic. Concerned 
about revenue loss, water companies continue to push against demand management, 
bulk water trading and reform of abstraction licences. While major changes in 
infrastructure and practice has stalled, there are some increasingly sophisticated 
technologies, not only in treating and transporting water, but in measuring and 
monitoring volumes and flows. Today, water supply companies in Britain can make 
precise estimates about water flows and availability. They can read individual household 
and business water meters from centralised computers and, though not permitted to halt 
provision entirely, can punish non-payment of water bills by reducing supplies to an 
agonising trickle. The technology also allows them to trace leaks, vandalisation, and a 
common form of protest when water shortages require the installation of local 
standpipes, in which people deliberately open public taps and leave them running.  
 
Such individual expressions of resentment, though plainly futile, make a notable contrast 
with earlier responses to water shortages in the UK, such as the “Save It” campaign of 
the 1970s when, under public ownership, water companies were able to encourage over 
90 per cent of households and businesses to reduce their levels of water use by at least 
30 and sometimes 40 per cent. But by 1995, “the climate had changed. The public 
blamed the water companies and the companies blamed the public” (Ward 1997: 95). 
Another drought, in 2012, produced similarly vituperative exchanges. Neither the water 
companies nor their deeply resentful “customers” appear willing to collaborate in a 
collective effort to manage water sustainably. Walker describes this as a failure of “meta-
governance” caused by the nature of capitalist exchange and its resulting production of 
nature: 
 
The internalisation of social and environmental externalities into capitalist modes of 
exchange is presented as a reflexive process, achieved via institutional and 
technological innovation. Multilateral agreements now promote the designation of an 
economic value to water... and endorse its economically efficient allocation and 
consumption in light of competing economic uses (European Parliament, 2000). 
Waterʼs economic status is increasingly recast from a public to a private good, its 
scarcity articulated as naturalised and absolute, and its management prescribed in 
terms of economic efficiency. (Walker 2014: 390) 
 
This suggests that the abdication of water governance to the market cannot produce the 
kinds of water use practices or the infrastructure that will protect human and non-human 
interests in the longer term.   
                                                          
4
 These deal primarily with effluent, nitrates and pesticides.  
5
 This was further supported by new building codes and campaigns aimed at inducing behavioural changes in water 
consumption.  
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b) The Abstraction of Water in Australia  
 
Though shaped by a very different context, a broadly similar direction of travel is evident 
in Australia. In the two centuries since Europeans colonised the continent, water 
infrastructure and governance has moved a long way away from the low-key forms of 
management and egalitarian ownership and control of water that Aboriginal people 
maintained prior to their arrival. The first actions of the European settlers entailed the 
seizure of key (that is reliable) water sources, and the displacement or domination of 
local indigenous communities. Refusing to acknowledge (or indeed recognise) indigenous 
ownership of land or resources, graziers, farmers and miners established their own forms 
of territorial land ownership which, at that time, included riparian rights to abstract water 
freely, either from rivers or by boring into artesian groundwaters.  
 
Colonial records reveal a worldview in which it was plain that the settlers had also 
imported an immutably dualistic view of nature and culture. Although water held its 
meaning as a generative source of life, this was channeled into a view of reproductive 
capacity as being primarily concerned with material and economic growth. Seeing this 
unfamiliar and physically challenging environment as “hostile” and “untamed” nature, 
and determined to establish a new nation, the settlers embarked upon an aggressive 
programme to exert dominion. Land clearance was rewarded with land ownership. Fences 
imposed territorial authority, and station housing provided a bulwark against the 
wilderness (see Schaffer 1998). Although affective attachments to place developed, both 
land and resources were regarded as alienable commodities, and the sentient landscape 
of Aboriginal Australians was overlaid with a cultural landscape focused intently on 
material opportunities and obstacles. Its waters were there to be directed into the 
settlers” economic activities, and its non-human inhabitants were seen as dangerous or 
destructive; as game; or as expendable competition for grazing. 
 
The introduction of an economic mode formed within temperate climes had significant 
ecological effects. The introduction of hard-hooved cattle onto delicate soil systems had 
major impacts on freshwater and marine ecosystems. Mining was (and continues to be)6 
detrimental to water quality. Farming intensified rapidly, most especially in areas such as 
the Murray Darling Basin and around other major rivers, and farmers and miners alike 
struggled to gain control of water. Thousands of bores were drilled into the Artesian 
Basin, but the wide fluctuations in the water flows of an arid environment remained 
challenging.  
 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, hoping to achieve both water security and fulfil a 
zealous (and indeed semi-religious) desire to “green the desert”, Australia embarked on 
the construction of massive irrigation schemes, for example in the Snowy River area, and 
in northern Queensland (see Hill 1965). Under a Federal system, water was 
constitutionally owned by subsidiary States, and there was much competition between 
them to build the biggest irrigation schemes. These were intended, primarily, to serve 
the interests of a landed “squattocracy” whose members largely composed both State 
and Federal governments. The States disbursed water allocations to farmers based on 
their ownership of the land, and for much of the 20th century allowed unlimited 
abstraction. They also carried responsibility for water supply to urban areas with this 
being devolved, in various ways, to local authorities.  
 
This status quo pertained until the 1980s, by which time the over-use of limited water 
resources (mostly by farmers but increasingly by other industries as well), was creating 
significant problems. Farming production had intensified to such an extent that rivers 
could no longer support unlimited abstraction, and there were other major issues as 
                                                          
6
 Many old mines continue to leach poisonous chemicals into the environment, and although major mining companies now 
claim to have prevented such problems, on-going alluvial mining and widespread quarrying also continue to pollute 
waterways.  
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irrigation began to salinate and thus render useless vast tracts of land.7 There were 
growing conflicts between upstream and downstream water users. Population growth and 
urban expansion had created a competing set of demands for water, and urban voters 
not only wanted reliable household supplies, they also generated new democratic 
demands for recreational access to water, and supported conservation groups in raising 
concerns about environmental well-being. For the first time – in the face of fierce 
protests – farmers were required to submit water management plans. The States began 
to impose volumetric limits on allocations for abstraction and made moves to install 
meters on bores and abstraction pumps.   
 
There was also a growing call to recognise indigenous rights. The civil rights movement 
in the 1960s had sparked a constitutional referendum in 1967 enfranchising Aboriginal 
Australians and Torres Strait Islanders. The ensuing Land Rights movement of the 1970s 
initiated efforts to bring Aboriginal Law and that of the Australian settlers together (see 
Attwood and Markus 1999, Reynolds 1987). The debates culminated in The Native Title 
Act (1993) which, after 200 years of denial,  acknowledged that indigenous Australians 
had a prior form of land and resource ownership (Toussaint 2004). Seeing this Act into 
law brought down Paul Keating”s relatively liberal regime, however, and the subsequent 
right-wing government, led by John Howard, shored up non-Aboriginal water ownership 
and control. Still, indigenous claims continue to move slowly through the legal system 
and some have been semi-successful, including a significant water rights claim in Arnhem 
Land (see Morphy and Morphy 2006).8 With the leverage of the Native Title Act behind 
them, Aboriginal groups have also managed to regain some limited rights of (traditional) 
use via Indigenous Land Use Agreements. 
 
Indigenous communities” efforts to regain water rights have been driven in part by a 
concern to reestablish their own environmental values and forms of management. 
Indigenous communities in Australia, as elsewhere, have made substantial critiques of 
settler societies” water and land use practices and their ecological costs, which often 
conflict not only with Aboriginal cultural values about “caring for country”, but with very 
specific beliefs about the proper maintenance of flows in material and spiritual worlds. In 
Australia, one of the most common concerns expressed by Aboriginal people in relation 
to infrastructural developments, and dams in particular, is that they disrupt proper water 
flows (Krause and Strang 2013). This is not merely a matter altering seasonal flow 
patterns and depriving aquatic ecosystems of sufficient water to support their non-human 
species: it is also seen to have a deeper impact on ancestral land and waterscapes.  
 
Despite some minor advances in regaining rights in relation to marine areas, the 
restoration of any indigenous control over freshwater has proved to be extremely elusive 
(Altman 2004). This is not readily apparent, as the Howard government, and various 
State governments have established “democratic” forms of water management via 
regional and local catchment management groups which include indigenous people, as 
well as representatives from conservation organisations. However, these have been 
effectively captured by farming and industry interests who, on the basis of their 
economic centrality, have resisted calls from subaltern voices to make any major 
changes to “business as usual” (see Lawrence 2005). This highlights a critical (and 
common) separation in water governance. Attempts to achieve environmental 
sustainability have been devolved to these “democratic”  – in fact unelected – regional 
groups in what could be described as an abdication of governmental responsibility, while 
the ownership and governance of water has remained firmly with State and Federal 
agencies and, increasingly, with private corporations.  
 
                                                          
7
 Salination occurs when the irrigation of shallow rooted crops raises salts to the surface, leaving the soils unable to support 
any – even native – vegetation. About 2 million hectares of land in Australia were categorised as saline in 2002 and it is 
thought that this may increase to 17 million hectares by 2050  (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015). 
8
 This was a significant case in that it was the first addressing water rights - albeit marine rights – directly.   
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The political realities are evident in the ownership and management of water treatment 
and supply infrastructure, for which Australian States have retained responsibility. The 
operational aspects of water supply are controlled by Government Owned Corporations 
(GOCs), which have been restructured to look and act like private companies – some 
suggest in preparation for full privatisation (Strang 2009). They have continued to invest 
public money in major water retention schemes, which are also meant to provide some 
capacity for flood mitigation.9  
 
More recently major investments have been made in recycling and desalination schemes 
which, though presented in terms of water security and ecological responsibility, are in 
part a response to a highly effective farming lobby. For example, at a cost of over 2.5 
billion dollars, Queensland recently built a “Western Corridor Recyling Scheme”. This 
supplies much of the water needed for energy generation around Brisbane, thus reducing 
the use of water from the Wivenhoe Dam upriver, which provides irrigation supplies to 
the farmers in the catchment area (Water Technology.Net 2015). Such major 
infrastructural developments now tend to rely on transnational corporations. Thus the 
Queensland scheme”s infrastructural development was carried out by Veolia, which 
continues to have responsibility for the operation of the plants and pipelines. Veolia 
(originally Vivendi) has operations in over 60 countries and recently posted €23.8 billion 
in revenues for 2014 (Veolia 2015).   
 
State governments in Australia have continued to disburse water allocations to farmers, 
and in particular to powerful irrigation companies wealthy enough to fund representatives 
to lobby National and State government representatives on their behalf. With some 
regulatory limitations on dam height, farmers are permitted to build their own 
impoundment and storage infrastructures. This has given major irrigation companies 
considerable infrastructural power. For example, in the early 2000s, the notorious Cubbie 
Station on the Queensland-New South Wales border was permitted to buy up over 50 
water allocation licenses and to build a vast diversion channel from the Culgoa River. 28 
miles of giant dams now divert into the company”s vast cotton and wheat growing 
enterprise about a quarter of the water that would otherwise flow into the already 
radically compromised Murray-Darling Basin. In 2012, like many major irrigation 
companies around the world, Cubbie Station was purchased by a transnational 
consortium (Strang 2013, Wagner 2013).  
 
In protecting their interests, farmers and other industries have consistently underlined 
their central role as “primary producers” in the national economy, as well as elaborating 
a long-running discourse about the “common good” achieved by their productive 
capacities. They have also claimed simultaneously to be protecting ecological well-being 
as the “Guardians of the Land”, but the ongoing intensification of their economic 
activities and Australia”s lack of progress in rehabilitating struggling ecosystems suggests 
that this guardianship is primarily directed towards human interests.  
 
The most recent development in Australian water and power relations has been the 
introduction of water trading, described by Caldecott as “privatisation by stealth” (2008: 
10). This allows farmers to sell off allocations of water formerly distributed by the State 
from a common pool. As well as reframing and commoditising water as an “asset”, this 
has detached water from land, so that in theory (and increasingly in practice) a hard-up 
farmer can sell water away from his or her land, leaving a “dry block”. It relies upon a 
virtual rather than physical market, thus wholly detaching economic activity from its 
social and material environment, with predictable ecological impacts (Ladson and 
Finlayson 2004, Young and McColl 2004).10 Predictably, many such allocations, like the 
major irrigation companies, have been bought up by transnational corporations who have 
                                                          
9
 As demonstrated by regular major flood events in south-east Queensland, flood mitigation infrastructure has dubious 
value in a landscape prone to flash flooding. 
10
 Similar virtual markets have been created in fish quotas, with not dissimilar effects (Minnegal and Dwyer 2010).  
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no local social base, or cause to be concerned for local ecological well-being. The agency 
of local human and non-human communities has thus been lost in abstraction.  
 
Conflicting Flows of Water and Power 
 
These case studies highlight a pattern of transnational water acquisition and absentee 
ownership that is being repeated around the world. Across the Tasman Sea, privatised 
water trading has also been introduced in New Zealand, and in 2012 Maori lost a lengthy 
legal battle to achieve recognition of their rights in water, and to prevent the government 
from selling off shares (and thus water allocations) in major hydro-power companies 
(Strang 2014). Despite equally impassioned protests in many parts of Asia and South 
America, dam building and the displacement of local riparian communities continue, in 
general replacing traditional forms of water control with corporate ownership and 
management (Shiva 2002). Following a period of disillusionment with dam-building, 
plans for further such infrastructural developments are currently being revived in Europe, 
and the ownership of these, like that of water companies, seems unlikely to remain in 
public hands.  
 
Successful opposition to the enclosure and privatisation of water resources is rare, and 
requires extreme measures. In the early 2000s only violent resistance in Bolivia fended 
off the purchase of the water supply industry by the American corporation, Bechtel, who 
demanded such a monopoly over water that they proposed preventing even the poorest 
people from collecting rainwater from their shanty roofs (see Albro 2005). But rallying 
coherent resistance requires not only a considerable level of desperation and social 
cohesion but also a clear focus. This is easier to discern when the threat is a total 
takeover by a single company, than when multiple water “trades” are purchased by 
multiple buyers in a complex and invisible water market.   
  
Nevertheless, there are some increasingly vocal counter-movements. Water”s 
essentiality, and the extreme issues around access, ownership, management and use, 
have given rise to a multiplicity of organisations, at local, national and international 
levels, who see water rights as a core social justice issue.11 More generally, longstanding 
ideas about water as a “common good” have proved persistent, as illustrated by the 
rejection, in the UK, of water companies” freedom to cut off water supplies to households 
failing to pay their bills.  These ideas surface regularly in conflicts over water ownership 
and remain conceptually linked with broader debates about collectivity and political 
enfranchisement. They are also implicit in the United Nation”s 2010 declaration, that all 
humans have the right to “clean and safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (UN 
General Asembley 2010). However, despite some improvements, 663 million humans still 
lack access to reliably clean drinking water, and over 30% of the world”s population is 
without basic sanitation facilities (UNICEF 2015).12 
 
Proposed solutions to this problem have tended to ignore its complex and intractable 
causes, which include the pressures of intense development and resource exploitation on 
populations and ecosystems; consequent strife and the displacement of local 
communities; environmental change and of course the overuse of water. The solutions 
generally promoted are not to reduce any of these underlying pressures, but instead to 
achieve more “economic growth”, more “efficient” resource use and management, 
including new and better methods of water capture and control. In this equation, water 
infrastructure has a central role as a “driver” of the envisioned growth and prosperity.  
 
Because water infrastructure supplies the generative “stuff of life” it is, like food 
production, difficult to see it in anything other than positive terms. The representational 
efforts of organizations such as Water Aid are full of images of new wells and happy 
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 For example, the Freshwater Action Network, Care International, UNICEF, The Water Project. 
12
 “In 2015, 663 million people still lack improved drinking water sources, 2.4 billion lack improved sanitation 
facilities and 946 million still practice open defecation” (UNICEF 2015). 
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smiling children dousing themselves in sprays of sparkling clean water. Invisible in these 
images is an underlying reality that Water Aid – while undeniably providing very real and 
immediate benefits to some communities – is funded by the UK water industry, via its 
collective organization Water UK. One of this industry”s most profitable activities is the 
international marketing of its expertise in water privatisation. Their aim is not merely to 
ensure a profitable sideline in selling water industry expertise, but more broadly to 
enlarge international water markets. For example, Wessex Water, bought by Asurix 
(owned by Enron) in 1998, then sold to a Malaysian energy group YTL in 2010, has sent 
multiple experts to Central America. Thames Water has provided the Australian 
Government with a number of advisers. Purchased by German company RWE shortly 
after being privatised, it was sold in 2006 to a consortium led by Australian bank 
Macquarie which has interests in about 80 companies worldwide.  
 
As anthropologists studying aid and development have plain, these activities are deeply 
entangled with the creation of new markets and sources of supply, underpinned by 
neoliberal visions in which economic growth is the desired outcome. Their analyses have 
elucidated the potential for both altruistic and self-serving development activities to 
compose new forms of economic colonialism (Arce and Long 1999). The water 
infrastructures being funded and constructed by water companies and development 
organisations in many parts of the world carry not only water but also ideas, values and 
practices. Critically, it enables the forging of links between industry experts and powerful 
political actors, and this serves to encourage and enable specific regimes of water and 
governance. (Mosse and Lewis 2005). 
  
Bioethical issues 
 
The lack of water available to some human populations raises particular difficulties for 
the counter-movements attempting to uphold the rights of non-human species and the 
material environment.13 Although both ecological and social justice activists frame their 
concerns in terms of rights, their claims are not always compatible. Even the most 
altruistic groups concerned with the provision of water to disadvantaged human 
communities may seek infrastructural developments that will take water away from 
ecosystems and their dependent non-human species.14  
 
The difficulty in taking a negative view of water infrastructure providing supplies to the 
most disadvantaged human communities is obvious. But just such a difficulty also 
discourages more ecologically oriented practices in the most affluent societies. Because 
water holds such powerfully positive meanings in terms of generative capacity, health 
and well-being cross-culturally, generous flows of water are invariably linked with images 
of wealth and status, security and of course power and agency (Strang 2004, 2009). But 
clearly such assumptions have to discount the costs of such infrastructure to the non-
human world, and thus override concerns about the rights and interests of non-human 
species.  
 
Such concerns have been with us for a long time: they emerged in early Romantic 
anxieties about the well-being of Nature , and gained major momentum in the 1960s and 
70s as part of powerful social justice movements in which feminists and other social 
activists also noted widening human and non-human inequalities. Friends of the Earth, 
for example, in its early years, focused on both social and ecological justice issues. Since 
that time, the conservation movement has fragmented and become increasingly 
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 For example People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the Animal Defense League, the Humanitarian League, the Farm 
Animal Rights Movement.  
14
 A parallel could readily be drawn with the many – and equally difficult to reconcile – conflicts over conservation, where 
animal rights (and/or the rights of a few people to benefit from tourism) frequently conflict with the rights and interests of 
traditional landowners (Homewood 2015). 
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detached from organisations concerned with human rights. It has been “adopted” by 
governments and corporate interests, brought under the purview of scientific authority, 
and thus largely deradicalised. With the exception of specific strands of activism 
concerned with animal rights, and some outliers such as Greenpeace, few conservation 
organisations articulate explicit discourses about non-human rights or the politics of 
overriding these. Most prefer, instead, to frame the issues in anodyne terms: as a matter 
of achieving sustainability, maintaining biodiversity, and now, of course, ensuring the 
ongoing provision of “ecosystem services”.  
 
So let us be clear. All water infrastructures have direct impacts upon non-human species 
and the material environment upon which they depend. The extent to which such 
infrastructures override non-human interests and divert water to support human 
communities, or aim to protect and support non-human well-being, is a direct measure of 
the social, environmental and political relations between human and non-human worlds.  
 
It will be plain from the preceding case studies that societal engagements with water 
which fully accomodate the needs and interests of non-human beings, or accord them 
agentive positions and some degree of social and political equality, are now extremely 
rare. As the overview of patterns of change in water ownership and control amply 
demonstrates, the direction of travel has largely been in the opposite direction, towards 
more dualistic division between humans and others; towards hierarchical social and 
political arrangements, affirmed by infrastructures assertive of human agency; and 
towards cosmologies reflective of these ideas and practices. After centuries of human 
“dominion”, culminating in the successful global promotion of short-termist and plainly 
unsustainable modes of environmental engagement, alternate approaches are generally 
presented as romantic, quixotic, and above all unrealistic.  
 
But is it actually more realistic to persist with growth-oriented practices that have 
produced existentially threatening levels of environmental change; a mass species 
extinction rate previously matched only by major planetary crises; rising levels of human 
deprivation; and ensuing social and political conflicts? Obviously not, but an 
acknowledgement that current practices are unsustainable also requires recognition that 
change cannot occur unless it takes place conceptually, socially and materially, and this 
means dealing with the challenges of long-term historical momentum in each of these 
areas.  
 
a) Cosmological Change 
 
In anthropology, efforts to articulate new ways of conceptualising human-environmental 
relations have led to a useful ongoing dialogue with philosophy about bioethics. This 
builds on earlier ethnographic research examining human-animal interactions (Haraway 
2008, Serpell 1996) and research with social and environmental counter-movements 
(Berglund 1998, Milton 1993). Also relevant have been developing theories about 
material culture (Boivin 2008, Knappett and Malafouris 2008, Tilley et al 2006) and 
material relations more generally (Bennett 2009, Coole and Frost 2010). This confluence 
of ideas has helped to encourage new theories comprehensively encompassing human 
and non-human beings as well as material agents and processes (Strang in press, Tsing 
2004).  
 
Anthropologists also have the advantage of long experience in working with diverse 
cultural communities whose cosmological belief systems do not conform to predominant 
views of human-non-human relations. Indigenous communities” worldviews and relations 
with “the other” have not merely been the inspiration for many environmental groups, 
they have made a substantial contribution to the development of anthropological theory, 
adding greatly to its capacity to imagine multiple lifeways and alternatives to prevailing 
norms (Hirsch and Strathern 2004). Indigenous and anthropological theories therefore 
combine usefully to highlight the need for a reconsideration of human assumptions of 
dominion and the commoditising reduction of the non-human world to a set of material 
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assets. Perhaps most critically, they open up ways to reintegrate disastrously fragmented 
thinking about social, economic and ecological processes, and provide a bridge across the 
intellectual gulf between the social and natural sciences.    
 
b) Social and Political Change 
 
If societies adopted ways of thinking that do not separate economic activity from social 
and ecological processes, such conceptual reintegration would demand expression in 
political and material arrangements. It would tackle, for example, the crucial structural 
separation between agencies responsible for supporting economic activities, and those 
focused on protecting ecosystemic well-being, which allows the costs of economic 
activities to be externalised to non-human beings. It would produce similarly integrative 
legislation and regulatory mechanisms, and it would reveal the separation between 
(human) economic and social interests and (non-human) ecological systems and their 
inhabitants  as a specific prioritisation of rights and interests.  
 
It is difficult to imagine such changes being made without radical political action. At the 
moment there is much polarisation between mainstream political life and the various 
counter-movements calling for greater emphasis on social and ecological well-being. The 
status quo is upheld, to some extent, by widespread (and much encouraged) fears about 
extremism, with demonisation readily overriding discourses about the causes of 
inequalities, including – of course – exclusion from the ownership and control of water 
and other essential resources.  
  
c) Owning and controlling water 
 
Water infrastructures can express multiple forms of agency, including that of far-off 
transnational corporations and non-resident shareholders.  As noted earlier, in a world of 
virtual water markets and non-resident water and irrigation company ownership, the elite 
networks benefiting most from the control of the Earth”s freshwater are often 
geographically distant from the ecosystems from which it is abstracted.15 They are thus 
well able to avoid paying tax in countries from which they are making considerable 
profits. For example, there was widespread outrage when Thames Water (now owned by 
an international consortium), avoided paying any UK corporation tax in 2013, despite a 
rise in water charges of 6.7%, revenues of £1.6 billion and operating profits of £549 
million (BBC 2013). Perhaps more critically, in the longer term, the lack of shared 
location makes it difficult for international consortia to see or feel the need to 
accommodate the interests of local human and non-human residents. Like generals far 
behind the battle lines, they can exercise power without personal consequences. Yet they 
are able to make decisions about where and how water flows are directed, and about 
who (or what) benefits or pays the price for these choices. Empowered by water, they 
may therefore be described as a new “despotic regime”.  
 
This poses a related question about water and power, which I have raised elsewhere 
(2004, 2010). If the ownership of water and other essential material resources, and the 
infrastructural wherewithal to manage these, are not held democratically by the State, 
who owns the State? How does it exercise power? Does it even exist? As Walker reminds 
us: “the state, as coordinator of collective action and as an intermediary between the 
public and private spheres, has significantly changed in nature” (2014: 390). He 
describes this as a shift from government to governance (see also Tortajada 2010). 
 
 Such governance is enacted through international legislation, which theoretically 
protects people”s most basic rights to water and through national regulatory bodies such 
as the UK”s Office of Water Services (OFWAT) which attempts to restrain companies from 
imposing high charges for water supply, and its Environment Agency, which tries to 
                                                          
15
 In this sense, virtual water markets and absentee ownership challenge Godelier”s claim that property is not real unless it 
is concrete (1986). 
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enforce legislation aimed at environmental protection. However, both international and 
national regulatory efforts have proved largely ineffectual in achieving any of these aims. 
As noted above, millions of people lack basic access to water supply and sanitation; 
water charges in countries where the industry has been privatised have uniformly 
experienced major increases in water charges (in the UK these rose by 60% in the first 
five years of privatised delivery); and fewer than 1% of Europe”s rivers meet the 
standards of the EU Water Framework Directive (2000).   
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the acquisition of water supply or irrigation companies 
by transnational corporations, and in particular those regarded as “foreign”, continues to 
generate widespread concern and resentment about water privatisation and its social and 
ecological effects. And the handing over of power to transnational corporations, and more 
generally to “the market” has undoubtedly contributed to rising cynicism about the 
extent to which governments (of any hue) are representative “of” the people or able to 
protect human or non-human interests.  
 
Conclusion 
 
What emerges, then, is a rather alarming picture of water and power moving upwards 
and outwards to the extent that both are held by a largely untouchable and 
unaccountable despotic regime. Holding water and other key resources, this network, 
linked by economic and social relations and common ideology, is well placed to pull the 
strings of national governments and render them impotent, and to have major impacts 
on the lives of local communities and ecosystems while remaining out of reach of any 
protests that might ensue. Meanwhile cynicism, and a sense of powerlessness to effect 
change, has radically reduced people”s willingness to limit their own resource use in 
order to protect the commons. 
 
Yet water infrastructures themselves are ineluctably local and material. On the one hand 
they concretise and perpetuate specific beliefs and values and enable the practices that 
express these. They are not readily deconstructed, and are therefore intrinsic to historical 
momentum. But like any form of material culture, they – and water itself – also have a 
social life in which their meanings and usages can change (Wagner 2013). Carrying the 
stuff of life itself, they provide an ideal focus for social and political action. Pressure to 
change water infrastructures and their fluid outcomes can enact, simultaneously, a 
pressure to change political arrangements and the human and non-human relationships 
that they compose.  
 
As noted at the outset, there are many ways to own and appropriate water. River 
catchment management groups and local communities can work directly on the physical 
environment as well as campaigning for better water management. Experts with the 
authority of specialised knowledge can participate in decision-making about 
infrastructural developments. Counter-movements and water users can lobby for new 
political and material arrangements.  
 
There is also a great, untapped well of consumer power. In the broadest sense, having 
control over water is partly a matter of having the purchasing power to acquire food and 
other products containing it. While debates about water ownership focus on infrastructure 
and supply, it is important to remember that wealthy societies depend heavily on 
imported goods and thus embodied water from poorer countries (Allan 2011). Water in 
arid areas is used to produce goods that require major amounts of water, to be shipped 
to markets in more temperate climes. Meissner notes, for example, that German water 
users have an international water footprint extending across 400 different countries 
(2012). Consumers are thus fully implicated in a process that moves water around the 
world to their advantage, and which – by providing the market – underpins specific 
regimes of water ownership and supply. But this also suggests considerable capacity for 
them to influence such regimes through making different choices about their patterns of 
consumption.  
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There are, therefore multiple subaltern ways of owning and controlling places and 
resources which have some potential to change the direction of water. Whether such 
subaltern forms can effect real political and material change, and thus a change in 
human-non-human relations, remains to be seen. But, in the end, the environment itself, 
impartially and inexorably, will continue to respond to human expressions of agency and 
power through water: if these are unsustainable they will, quite simply, cease to be 
sustained.  
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